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Abstract—Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology has been regarded as
a promising way to help Content Providers (CPs) cost-effectively
distribute content. However, under the traditional Internet pric-
ing mechanism, the fact that most P2P traffic flows among peers
can dramatically decrease the profit of ISPs, who may take
actions against P2P and impede the progress of P2P technology.
In this paper, we develop a mathematical framework to analyze
such economic issues. Inspired by the idea from cooperative game
theory, we propose a cooperative profit-distribution model based
on Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), in which eyeball ISPs and
Peer-assisted CPs (PCPs) form two coalitions respectively and
then compute a fair Pareto point to determine profit distribution.
Moreover, we design a fair and feasible mechanism for profit dis-
tribution within each coalition. We show that such a cooperative
method not only guarantees the fair profit distribution among
network participators, but also helps to improve the economic
efficiency of the overall network system. To our knowledge, this is
the first work that systematically studies solutions for P2P caused
unbalanced profit distribution and gives a feasible cooperative
method to increase and fairly share profit.
Keywords: P2P, Internet Service Providers, Content Providers,
Profit Distribution, Nash Bargaining Solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) or peer-assisted architecture offers great
potential for Content Providers (CPs) to cost-effectively dis-
tribute content by capitalizing network resources of end users.
Its economical superiority to the traditional Client/Server (C/S)
architecture has been demonstrated by lots of academic work
[1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and successful commercial systems. We
believe more and more CPs will adopt P2P technology in the
future. This trend seems irreversible.
However, under traditional pricing mechanism, free-riding
P2P traffic can cause unbalanced profit distribution be-
tween Peer-assisted CPs (PCPs) and eyeball Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) [6]. As we know, for eyeball ISPs who
directly connect end users and CPs, they usually charge users
at a flat price [7], [8], [9]. Then, for users, P2P traffic can
“free-ride” in each eyeball ISP’s network. This will stimulate
users to consume more P2P services. Then, PCPs’ profit will
sharply increase, while eyeball ISPs’ profit will dramatically
decrease. It should be noted that unlike eyeball ISPs, transit
ISPs [6] often charge their attached eyeball ISPs based on
exchanged traffic [10] and thus do not give the chance of free
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riding to P2P. Thus, throughout this paper, when referring to
ISPs, we always mean eyeball ISPs.
The unbalanced profit distribution between PCPs and ISPs
will drive ISPs to take actions against free-riding P2P, which
include engineering [11], [12], [13], [14] and pricing strategies
[15], [16], [17]. We only consider the latter because such
imbalance is caused by ISPs’ flat pricing model. An effective
strategy is to change flat pricing model on users’ side to a
volume-based pricing model [8], [16], [17]. Then, although
ISPs’ profit can be guaranteed at a reasonable level, P2P
applications will be less attractive to users as a higher fee,
causing a sharp decrease in PCPs’ profit.
Now that the unbalanced profit distribution can finally
impede the wide adoption of P2P technology, someone may
ask: Can we find a profit-distribution model in which P2P
technology can also benefit ISPs? In this paper, we give a
positive answer to this question.
Inspired by the idea from cooperative game theory, we
propose a cooperative profit-distribution model based on the
concept of Nash bargaining [18]. In this model, ISPs and PCPs
form two coalitions and cooperate to maximize their total
profit by stimulating P2P service and fairly dividing profit.
To guarantee stability, we also consider proper mechanism for
profit distribution within each coalition. The main contribu-
tions of this paper are listed as follows:
1) We build a mathematical framework to describe the
multilateral interactions among ISPs, CPs and users in
three possible non-cooperative states;
2) We propose a cooperative profit-distribution model in
which P2P technology can fairly benefit both PCP and
ISP coalitions;
3) We design a fair and feasible mechanism for profit
distribution within each coalition;
4) We give examples to prove the effectiveness of the
cooperative profit-distribution model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
discuss the non-cooperative pricing interactions among ISPs,
PCPs and users. A cooperative profit distribution model is
proposed in Section III. Further, we present our mechanism
for profit distribution within each coalition in Section IV.
In Section V, we discuss the related work followed by our
conclusion in Section VI.
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II. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME MODEL
In this section, we first present a network model and ex-
plore the multi-lateral economic relationships among network
participators using a two-stage game model. Then, we extend
our model with P2P providers (PCPs), which results in three
possible non-cooperative market states as possible equilibrium.
A. Network Model
The network model consists of three communities: ISP
community, CP community and user community, denoted
by MISP, MCP and Muser respectively. Their relationships
are shown in Fig. 1. In a practical network system, MISP
often adopts a bandwidth-based pricing model (such as the
95-percentile billing for burstable bandwidth [10]) to charge
MCP and a flat pricing model to chargeMuser [9], [19].MCP
often charges Muser based on its traffic volume.
Fig. 1. Relationships among ISP, CP and user community.
In C/S network, all service contents flow from MCP to
Muser through MISP’s network. Suppose the total traversing
bandwidth provided byMISP is bISP, the bandwidth bought by
MCP from MISP is bCP and that bought by Muser is buser. For
MCP andMuser, suppose their average bandwidth usage ratios
are ξCP and ξuser, respectively. Let v be the traffic volume.
Then, as traffic is balanced, we have
v = bCP · ξCP = buser · ξuser. (1)
In peer-assisted network, MCP = MPCP ∪ MrCP, where
MPCP is the set of PCPs and MrCP consists of the rest CPs.
We suppose the traffic ofMPCP accounts for a proportion α in
the total traffic of MCP. Generally, the P2P content provided
by servers of PCPs accounts for only a small proportion β
and the rest 1 − β proportion is provided by Muser. In this
case, MPCP can reduce its bought bandwidth to a smaller
value b∗PCP to save cost and keep its bandwidth usage ratio
at ξCP; whileMuser with fixed bandwidth at buser will increase
its bandwidth usage ratio to a higher value ξ∗user. Here, we
assume the traffic of MrCP (background traffic) will not be
impacted by P2P traffic. Then MrCP will keep its traffic at
vcs = bCP · (1 − α) · ξCP. So for P2P content, suppose total
user-side uploading and downloading P2P traffic amount is
vp2p and it is not larger than buser · ξCP − vcs, we will have
b∗PCP · ξCP
β
=
vp2p
1 + (1− β) .
Then, similar to the case of C/S network, we should have
vp2p+vcs = b
∗
PCP·ξCP·
2− β
β
+bCP·(1−α)·ξCP = buser·ξ∗user, (2)
where ξCP ≥ ξ∗user ≥ ξuser. Here we assume β > 0, which
means server always provides content and makes the equation
meaningful.
B. Basic Two-stage Non-cooperative Game
We analyze a two-stage game model to determine bandwidth
requirement buser of Muser. We also aim to derive the basic
traffic usage v at equilibrium. We use backward induction to
solve this game and obtain an initial equilibrium market state
(State 0).
1) Game formulation: We first form multi-lateral utilities
of network participators to explain their relationships shown
in Fig. 1 and then present our two-stage game formulation.
At the first stage, MISP and MCP decide the prices through
a non-cooperative game, then, at the second stage, Muser
make the best response traffic usage decision according to
the prices.
Initially, suppose MISP charges MCP using a
bandwidth-based price pb and charges Muser using a
flat price τ . We assume the equivalent bandwidth-based unit
price of τ is the same as pb. Thus, τ is often set based on a
given ξuser (τ = vξuser · pb). Then, clearly, the profit of MISP is
UISP(pb) = bCP · pb + τ −CISP(v)
=
(
v
ξCP
+ vξuser
)
· pb −CISP(v), (3)
where CISP(·) is a composite cost function [20].
For MCP, let ps be unit service price and Fad(·) be a
volume-based advertisement fee function. Then, its profit is
UCP(ps) = v · ps + Fad(v)− bCP · pb −CCP(v)
= v · ps + Fad(v)− vξCP · pb −CCP(v),
(4)
where CCP(·) is a volume-based cost function.
In addition, let Euser(v) be the experience value for Muser
consuming content volume v. Then, its utility is
Uuser(v) = Euser(v)− (buser · pb + v · ps)
= Euser(v)− ( pbξuser + ps) · v.
(5)
In C/S network, a three-player game can characterize the
interactions. MISP and MCP act as leaders to price Muser,
which acts as follower to decide traffic usage.
According to backward induction for leader-follower game,
we first analyze the second stage of this game, assuming that
MISP and MCP have set the prices at the first stage.
The follower’s problem
Given pb and ps, Muser is going to maximize its utility in
Eq.(5). By solving the follower’s problem, we can obtain the
service content consumed by Muser as
vˆ(pb, ps) = min{argmax
v
Uuser, buser · ξcp}. (6)
which is the users’ best response traffic usage decision within
its purchased capacity. Let o(v) = dEuser(v)dv , o(v) is a one-to-
one mapping. Then based on our assumption that the network
is underused, we have vˆ(pb, ps) = o−1(d · pb + ps).
The leaders’ problems
Anticipating users will choose v = vˆ(pb, ps) as its traffic
usage, the leaders’ problems become
For MISP: max
pb
UISP(pb, vˆ(pb, ps))
and
For MCP: max
ps
UCP(ps, vˆ(pb, ps)).
Then a two-player non-cooperative game happens between
MISP andMCP. They take turns to optimize their own objects
UISP and UCP by varying their decision variables pb and ps,
respectively, treating the other as constant.
2) Game solution: Let (p∗b , p
∗
s) be the Nash Equilibrium,
then, according to the definition of Nash Equilibrium, the
solution turns out to be as follows
p∗b = argmax
pb
UISP(pb, vˆ(pb, p
∗
s)),
p∗s = argmax
ps
UCP(p
∗
b , vˆ(p
∗
b , ps)).
(7)
We have the following theorem on the simplified sufficient
conditions of Nash Equilibrium for this problem.
Theorem 1: Let (p∗b , p
∗
s) be the Nash Equilibrium defined
in Eq.(7) and v∗ = vˆ(p∗b , p
∗
s). Then, let
Φ1(v) = c · v · 1d · do(v)dv − dCISP(v)dv ,
Φ2(v) = v · do(v)dv + dFad(v)dv − dCCP(v)dv .
(8)
It must satisfy the following two conditions
(i). o(v∗) + Φ1(v∗) + Φ2(v∗) = 0,
(ii). ( cd · do(v)dv + dΦ1(v)dv )|v∗ < 0 and
( do(v)dv +
dΦ2(v)
dv )|v∗ < 0,
where c = 1ξuser +
1
ξcp
, and e = 1ξcp .
Proof: Obviously we have o(v∗) = d · p∗b + p∗s according
to the first order condition of Eq.(5).
According to the definition of Nash Equilibrium, p∗b should
be the best response to p∗s and vice versa. Since we do not
consider the cases where the maximum profit happens at the
boundary, we must have
∂EISP(pb,p
∗
s)
∂pb
|p∗b = 0,
∂E2ISP(pb,p
∗
s)
∂pb
|p∗b < 0,
∂ECP(p
∗
b ,ps)
∂ps
|p∗s = 0, ∂E
2
CP(p
∗
b ,ps)
∂ps
|p∗s < 0.
(9)
Moreover, because v = o−1(d · pb + ps) exists, we have
∂EISP(v,p
∗
s)
∂v |v∗ = ∂EISP(pb,p
∗
s)
∂pb
|p∗b · ∂pb∂v |v∗ ,
∂pb
∂v |v∗ = 1d do(v)dv |v∗ 6= 0,
∂ECP(v,p
∗
b )
∂v |v∗ = ∂EISP(p
∗
b ,ps)
∂ps
|p∗s · ∂ps∂v |v∗ ,
∂ps
∂v |v∗ = do(v)dv |v∗ 6= 0.
We can apply the above properties on conditions in Eq.(9) and
rewrite them as follows
∂EISP(v,p
∗
s)
∂v |v∗ = 0, ∂E
2
ISP(v,p
∗
s)
∂v |v∗ < 0,
∂ECP(p
∗
b ,v)
∂v |v∗ = 0, ∂E
2
CP(p
∗
b ,v)
∂v |v∗ < 0.
(10)
From Eq.(10), Eq.(3), Eq.(4) and o(v∗) = d ·p∗b +p∗s , we have
c · p∗b + c · v∗ · 1d · do(v)dv |v∗ − dCISP(v)dv |v∗ = 0,
p∗s + v
∗ · do(v)dv |v∗ + dFad(v)dv |v∗ − e · pb − dCCP(v)dv |v∗ = 0.
It can be further simplified based on Eq.(8) as follows
c · p∗b + Φ1(v∗) = 0,
p∗s + Φ2(v
∗)− e · p∗b = 0.
(11)
v∗ must satisfy the following condition in order to be the traffic
usage at a Nash Equilibrium
o(v∗) + Φ1(v∗) + Φ2(v∗) = 0. (12)
Second order conditions in Eq.(10) can be simplified as
( cd · ∂o(v)∂(v) + ∂Φ1(v
∗)
∂v )|v∗ < 0, and
(∂o(v)∂(v) +
∂Φ2(v
∗)
∂v )|v∗ < 0.
(13)
This theorem presents a way to compute Nash Equilibrium
which represents the steady state of this network market
(denoted as State 0).
3) Example and equilibrium analysis: In a practical system,
CCP(·) is often increasing and concave. CISP(·) is often
continuous increasing. When v is small, the growth rate of
this cost decreases with a larger v and when v is large, the
growth rate increases with a even larger v due to congestion
(We use congestion cost to indicate potential expansion cost
for ISPs, which increase fast when v approaches to bISP [20]).
Generally, Fad(·) and Euser(·) are increasing and concave.
Fig. 2. Change trends of CCP(v), CISP(v), Fad(v) and Euser(v).
Without loss of generality, we take CCP(v) = ln (v + 1) +
0.2, CISP(v) = ln (v + 1)+100( 1bISP−v − 1bISP )+0.4, Fad(v) =
5 ln(v + 1) and Euser(v) = 5 ln(v + 1), which have the above
mentioned properties (See Fig. 2). Then, according to Eq.(6)
and our assumption, we have vˆ(pb, ps) = 5d·pb+ps − 1 which
will not exceed the capacity. Based on Theorem 1, we can
directly derive the Nash Equilibrium in closed-form. Then,
we can further study the sensitivity of v∗ on variables ξCP and
ξuser. Here, we assume bISP = 100, 0.1 ≤ ξuser, ξCP ≤ 0.75 and
ξuser ≤ 0.4 · ξCP, then we find that the smaller ratio between
ξuser and ξCP, the higher v∗.
Assume ξCP = 0.75 and ξuser = 0.25 (similar to Nor-
ton’s prediction on bandwidth usage ratios [21]). The cor-
responding utilities of participators are (UISP,UCP,Uuser) =
(2.2438, 3.9942, 2.3281).
C. P2P-involved Profit Computing Model
One important work of this paper is to measure and quantify
P2P traffic’s impact on the network economic market under
traditional pricing mechanism. It help us to analyze and predict
potential changes of participators’ decisions.
Based on the results in last subsection, we first analyze
the growing impact of P2P traffic on the profits or utilities
of Internet participators when the pricing has not changed,
i.e., State 1.MISP will bear an increasingly large burden with
the growing P2P traffic based on Eq.(3). Therefore we give
an analysis of MISP’s reactive behavior conditionally and
study its corresponding aftermath, i.e., State 2. Finally, we
give a state transformation graph to summarize these possible
non-cooperative market states and their transition conditions.
1) State 1: In peer-assisted network, we assume vcs will
not be impacted by the emergence of P2P traffic (i.e. vcs =
v∗cs = v
∗ ·(1−α)). It is reasonable when people give priority to
inelastic needs of traditional Internet services (such as email
and web) which are unlikely to become P2P-assisted.
Compared with C/S mode, P2P can improve the experience
of Muser because of its scalability (especially as the acceler-
ated service speed). So let Êuser be Muser’s new experience
value for content downloading profile v = vp2p + v∗cs and
we assume Êuser(v) > Euser(v) as along as v > v∗cs (i.e.,
vp2p > 0). Let a be the experience accelerate factor of P2P
traffic (which is related with β and always satisfies a > 1),
so we have Êuser(v) = Euser(a · (v − v∗cs) + v∗cs). Indeed, we
simply assume that a and β satisfy a linear relationship. So
we create fitting curve for a based on two empirical points
(β, a) = (0.3, 4) (i.e., when 70% PCP content is provided
by P2P, users’ experience will expand to 4 times compared
with under C/S mode.) and (β, a) = (1, 1) (i.e., when all the
PCP content is provided by servers, the calculation of such
experience is the same as under C/S mode). Then, we get
a = 1 + 307 (1− β).
Remark 1: Intuitively, 1−β reflects P2P’s power and when
it becomes larger, the performance of P2P service will become
better as its distributed sharing nature. So we assume k
increases with 1 − β. As PCPs’ servers guarantee system
stability, they are generally indispensable (i.e., β > 0).
Often, MISP charges Muser at a flat price. Suppose new
average bandwidth usage ratio ξ∗user cannot exceed ξCP as
discussed in Section II-A. Let v˜p2p =
b∗user·ξCP−v∗cs
2−β . As long
as vp2p ≤ v˜p2p, the fee charged from Muser will be kept
at τ = b∗user · p∗b ; when vp2p > v˜p2p, we assume MISP will
charge on the excessive volume (vp2p − v˜p2p) · (2 − β) based
on a volume-based pricing. For bandwidth-based price p∗b ,
its equivalent volume-based price is p
∗
b
ξuser
. Thus, the utility of
Muser becomes
Uuser =

Êuser(v)− v · p∗s − τ, if vp2p ≤ v˜p2p;
Êuser(v)− v · p∗s − τ−
(vp2p − v˜p2p) · (2− β) · p
∗
b
ξuser
, otherwise.
(14)
Here, Muser will decide vS1p2p (since v = vp2p + v∗cs based on
our assumption) to maximize Uuser.Then, based on vS1p2p, we
can get UCP and UISP as follows.
For MCP, UCP will become
UCP = v
S1 · p∗s + Fad(vS1)− v
S1
p2p·β+v∗cs
ξCP
· p∗b − Ĉ(vS1),
(15)
where vS1 = vS1p2p + v
∗
cs and
vS1p2p·β+v∗cs
ξCP
denotes the bandwidth
purchased by MCP from MISP when the β proportion traffic
is provided by their own servers. Similar to Êuser(v), here we
define ĈCP(v) = CCP((v − v∗cs) · β + v∗cs) (0 < β ≤ 1) to
measure the cost alleviated through P2P-assisting.
Accordingly, UISP will become
UISP =

τ +
vS1p2p·β+v∗cs
ξCP
· p∗b −CISP(vS1), if vS1p2p <= v˜p2p;
τ + (vS1p2p − v˜p2p) · (2− β) · p
∗
b
ξuser
+
vS1p2p·β+v∗cs
ξCP
· p∗b −CISP(vS1), otherwise.
(16)
Following the foregoing example, we assume α = 0.6 (β =
0.3 as previously assumed). Then by solving the user-side
optimization problem, we can deduce the optimal point vS1p2p.
It is clear that vS1p2p > v
∗ · α. In addition, we can see that vS1p2p
increases to but does not exceed v˜p2p. This implies that Muser
will try to use up its original bandwidth bought from MISP
with a flat price but not to buy additional bandwidth. Then, we
can obtain (UISP,UCP,Uuser) = (1.5964, 7.2021, 9.6230) for
State 1. Compared with State 0, UCP increases by 80.31%,
while UISP decreases by 28.85%. Thus, motivated by profit
increase, some CPs will adopt P2P technology and become
PCPs. Then, the overall system will change from State 0 to
State 1.
Remark 2: Economically, the only condition for system to
change from State 0 to State 1 is that under traditional pricing
mechanism, US1CP > U
S0
CP. According to Eqs. (5) and (14), it is
easily proved that vS1p2p + vcs∗ > v∗ is always true.
2) State 2: For MISP, one main reason for its decreasing
profit is that it charges Muser at a flat price, which leads to
P2P free-riding. To defeat such free-riders, one effective way
is to change the original flat pricing model to a volume-based
pricing model [8], [16], [17]. Like in State 2, we adopt p
∗
b
ξuser
as
the volume-based price. Then, the utility of Muser becomes
Uuser = Êuser(v)− v · p∗s − [vp2p · (2− β) + v∗cs] · p
∗
b
ξuser
.
(17)
Muser chooses vS2p2p to obtain the feasible optimal traffic usage.
Then, the utilities of MISP and MCP can thus be solved. For
UCP, the computation method is equal to Eq.(15). Accordingly,
UISP becomes
UISP =
[
vS2p2p · (2− β) + v∗cs
]
· p∗bξuser +
vS2p2p·β+v∗cs
ξCP
· p∗b−
CISP(v
S2),
(18)
where vS2 = vS2p2p + v
∗
cs.
Correspondingly, we have (UISP,UCP,Uuser) =
(3.5180, 5.6450, 5.1712). Therefore, after MISP adopts
a volume-based pricing model, UISP increases by 120.66%,
while UCP decreases by 29.42%. Thus, motivated by profit
increase, MISP will change its flat pricing model on Muser
to a volume-based one. Then, the overall system will change
from State 1 to State 2. Since US2CP > U
S0
CP,MPCP still benefits
from P2P technology and will not take further actions against
MISP except for a better choice.
Remark 3: The two conditions for the overall system to
change from State 1 to State 2 are US1ISP < U
S0
ISP and U
S2
ISP >
US1ISP, respectively. If U
S1
ISP > U
S0
ISP, MISP will benefit from
P2P technology. However, according to Eqs.(14) and (17), it
is easy to prove that vS2p2p < v
S1
p2p is always true. Then, MISP
does not need to change its pricing model on Muser.
Remark 4: ForMPCP, if US2CP < US0CP (Since traffic demand
is suppressed under MISP’s user-side new pricing mode, the
saved cost cannot offset the reduced income), it may give up
P2P technology as the reduced profit. Then, the overall system
will be forced to change from State 2 to State 0.
3) Discussion and Non-cooperative State Analysis: In this
subsection, we describe another two possible non-cooperative
states. These help us to analyze how P2P technology will affect
the network participators’ behaviors and utilities. Through
analyzing these states, we can quantify the profits and predict
the possible profit changing trends of network participators
under fixed traffic profile (i.e., α and β) and unchanged pricing
levels (i.e., pb and ps). The reasons are as follows:
a) We need to study how P2P traffic impacts profit
distribution among these players if non-p2p traffic
(i.e., traffic ofMrCP) is treated the same as at State 0
by MISP and Muser;
b) MrCP decides β mostly based on its own technology
and network situation while minimizing its cost,
rather than based on complex economic computation.
Fig. 3 summarizes the state transformation conditions
among States 0, 1 and 2. We summarize all possible equilib-
rium states (i.e., subgame perfect Nash equilibriums, SPNEs)
that system can attain and the conditions for each one.
Fig. 3. State transformation among States 0, 1 and 2 (We use S0, S1 and S2
for short). The conditions for the three transitions T1, T2 and T3 are: (1) T1:
US1CP > U
S0
CP; (2) T2: U
S1
ISP < U
S0
ISP and U
S2
ISP > U
S1
ISP; (3) T3: U
S2
CP < U
S0
CP.
For the forgoing example, its game tree is illustrated in
Fig. 4. As this tree shows, the game starts from an empty
circle and MCP decides whether to adopt P2P technology. If
so, the game goes to the filled circle. Then, MISP decides
which pricing model will be used to charge Muser, i.e., “flat”
or “usage-based”. Afterwards, the game is over. Based on
backward induction, we get (P2P, usage-based pricing) as the
SPNE and the equilibrium payoff vector is (5.0835, 3.5226).
We can verify that it satisfies the conditions for State 2 to be
the final state (i.e., T1 instead of T2 in Fig. 3).
In a practical system, using the state transformation con-
ditions in Fig. 3, we can conclude the conditions for each
Fig. 4. An example of this dynamic game, on the leaf nodes are the utility
values of (UCP,UISP) at different states.
SPNE. Under certain condition, each state can be a proper
Nash equilibrium.
For different traffic profiles (α, β), we can correspondingly
derive the utilities ofMISP andMCP as Fig. 5 shows. We plot-
ted the initial equilibrium utilities computed in Section II-B
as a comparison.
Practically, β is often smaller than 0.5. Then in Fig. 5, we
can see the overall system finally stop at State 2, whereMISP
charges Muser using an usage-based pricing model. Here,
US2ISP increases by 120.66% compared with U
S1
ISP and increases
by 56.99% compared with US0ISP; U
S2
CP reduces by 29.42%
compared with US1CP though increases by 27.27% compared
with US0CP.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. (a) UISP and (b) UCP for different α and β.
III. COOPERATIVE PROFIT-DISTRIBUTION MODEL
In this section, we propose a cooperative profit distribution
model based on the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution
(NBS) [18], in which ISPs and PCPs cooperatively maximize
their total profit and then fairly distribute profit based on NBS.
Based on our analysis in the Section II-C1, we notice
that in the peer-assisted network, Muser may use up its
original bandwidth bought from MISP at a flat price without
buying additional bandwidth at a volume-based price. Here we
consider the following cooperation: PCP coalition sells content
at a discount rate γPCP and ISP coalition charges the increased
bandwidth bought by Muser at a discount rate γISP. Both of
them try to encourage Muser to consume more content and
buy more bandwidth for P2P applications. Fig. 6 shows that
ISPs and PCPs must cooperate to encourageMuser to consume
more P2P content and to gain increased total profit.
Fig. 6. Utotal for different γISP and γPCP in the peer-assisted network with
traffic profiles (α, β) = (0.6, 0.3).
In this cooperation, Uuser, UISP and UCP become
Uuser =

Êuser(v)− (vp2p · γPCP + v∗cs) · p∗s − τ,
if vp2p ≤ v˜p2p;
Êuser(v)− (vp2p · γPCP + v∗cs) · p∗s − τ−
(vp2p − v˜p2p) · (2− β) · p
∗
b
ξuser
· γISP, otherwise.
UISP =

τ +
vp2p·β+v∗cs
ξCP
· p∗b −CISP(v),
if vp2p ≤ v˜p2p;
τ + (vp2p − v˜p2p) · (2− β) · p
∗
b
ξuser
· γISP+
vp2p·β+v∗cs
ξCP
· p∗b −CISP(v), otherwise.
UCP = (vp2p · γPCP + v∗cs) · p∗s + Fad(v)−
vp2p·β+v∗cs
ξCP
· p∗b − ĈCP(v).
Here, a leader-follower game happens between the cooperative
group and Muser. The former changes γISP and γPCP to
maximize its total profit:
Utotal = UISP +UCP.
WhileMuser as the price taker changes vp2p to maximize Uuser:
for the Muser :
v̂ = argmax
vp2p
Uuser(γISP, γPCP);
for the cooperative group :
max
γISP,γPCP
Utotal(γISP, γPCP, v̂(γISP, γPCP)).
(19)
By solving the above problem under different traffic profiles,
we obtain the optimal values of vp2p, γPCP and Utotal illustrated
in Fig. 7, which shows that γPCP and Utotal decrease with the
increase of α or β.
Then, for traffic profile (α, β) = (0.6, 0.6), we can obtain
the unique Stacklberg Equilibrium point where γ∗ISP = 0,
(a)
(b)
Fig. 7. Optimal γPCP and Utotal for different α and β.
γ∗PCP = 0.3443 and v
S3
p2p = 56.0140. The results indicate
that MISP will freely upgrade Muser’s access bandwidth.
Correspondingly, (US3total,U
S3
user) = (19.4287, 19.0598). We can
see that after cooperation, both Utotal and Uuser increase dra-
matically. Before PCP shares profit with ISP, (US3’ISP,U
S3’
CP ) =
(4.90593, 14.5227). For all cases, UISP +UCP ≤ US3total. Thus,
UISP +UCP = U
S3
total (20)
is the corresponding Pareto boundary.
Now, we are faced with an important question: How can
ISP and PCP coalitions choose a fair point on the Pareto
boundary as their profit distribution? As discussed previously,
without cooperation, their profit distribution may reach one of
the following points (see Fig. 3): (US0ISP,U
S0
CP), (U
S1
ISP,U
S1
CP),
or (US2ISP,U
S2
CP). In Nash bargaining, such a point is called
the starting point [22]. We denote it as (UsISP,U
s
CP). Then,
according to the fairness concept of NBS, the fair profit
distribution will be on the Pareto boundary and can be deduced
by
maximize
UISP,UCP
(UISP −UsISP)(UCP − UsCP),
subject to UISP +UCP = US3total.
(21)
Here, NBS satisfies all the following four axioms [23], [22],
[18]: (1) Invariant to equivalent utility representations; (2)
Pareto optimality; (3) Independence of irrelevant alternatives;
and (4) Symmetry. By solving the above optimization problem,
we can obtain a fair profit distribution as follows:
US3ISP = U
s
ISP +
US3total−UsISP−UsCP
2 ,
US3CP = U
s
CP +
US3total−UsISP−UsCP
2 .
(22)
Then, the profit that PCP coalition should transfer to ISP
coalition is R = US3ISP −US3’ISP = US3’CP −US3CP.
For different traffic profiles, we illustrate the improvement
of US3ISP and U
S3
CP compared with starting point as we have
analyzed in Section II-C3) in Fig. 8. Fig. 8 shows that
compared with the starting point, UISP increases by more than
110% and UCP increases by more than 70%.
Specifically, for α = 0.6 and β = 0.3, the Nash bar-
gaining between ISP and PCP coalitions is illustrated in
Fig. 9, which shows that the corresponding starting point is(
US2ISP,U
S2
CP
)
= (3.5180, 5.6450). According to Eq.(22), we
can obtain (US3ISP,U
S3
CP) = (8.6508, 10.7778) as the final profit
distribution. The profit that PCP coalition should assign to ISP
coalition is R = 3.7449. Compared with the starting point,
UISP increases by 145.90% and UCP increases by 90.92%.
Thus, both ISP coalition and PCP coalition benefit much from
this cooperation.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 8. The improvement of US3ISP and U
S3
CP compared with the starting point
for different α and β.
Fig. 9. An example of Nash bargaining between ISP and PCP coalitions
(α, β) = (0.6, 0.3).
IV. PROFIT DISTRIBUTION WITHIN EACH COALITION
In this section, we will propose a mechanism to determine
profit distribution within each coalition and discuss on its
fairness and feasibility.
A. Profit Distribution Mechanism
To guarantee the stability of each coalition, the profit
distribution mechanism should have the property of fairness.
Before the mechanism, we give some definitions first.
Suppose there are m ISPs and n PCPs. For the i-th PCP
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), we define two traffic matrices as follows:
1) Ti =
(
tij,k
)
m×m
, where tij,k denotes the amount of the
i-th PCP’s traffic volume transmitted from the users in
the j-th ISP’s network to the users in the k-th ISP’s
network; and
2) T˜i = diag(t˜i1, t˜
i
2, · · · , t˜im), where t˜ij denotes the amount
of the i-th PCP’s traffic volume transmitted from its
content servers to the users in the j-th ISP’s network
(Note that this part of uploading traffic will be charged
by the corresponding ISP on the i-th PCP side).
Thus, in PCP coalition, the amount of traffic volume caused
by the i-th PCP accounts for a proportion
ϕi =
( ∑
1≤j,k≤m
tij,k
)
+
(
m∑
j=1
t˜ij
)
vp2p
, (23)
For ISP coalition, its two corresponding aggregated traffic
matrices are defined by
T =
n∑
i=1
Ti, T˜ =
n∑
i=1
T˜i.
Suppose T = (tj,k)m×m and T˜ = diag(t˜1, t˜2, · · · , t˜m). Then,
in the l-th ISP’s network (where 1 ≤ l ≤ m), the amount of
P2P traffic volume caused by PCP coalition on users’ side is
$l =
(
k=m∑
k=l
tl,k
)
+
(
k=m∑
k=l
tk,l
)
+ t˜l. (24)
In addition, in the l-th ISP’s network, let vl and bl be the total
traffic volume on users’ side and the total bandwidth bought
by all users using a flat price, respectively. It should be noted
that
m∑
l=1
bl = b
S0
user. Then, in the l-th ISP’s network, we can
verify that the amount of background C/S traffic volume is
vl − $l and free-riding P2P traffic volume is vl − bl · ξuser.
According to the network model described in Section II-A,
clearly,
m∑
l=1
[bl · ξuser − (vl −$l)] = vS0 · α.
In addition, we can deduce that the l-th ISP’s contribution to
the free riding of P2P traffic accounts for a proportion
ψl =
vl − bl · ξuser
vp2p · (2− β)− vS0 · α. (25)
Consequently, we propose a fair and feasible profit distri-
bution mechanism. For a given R, the profit that the i-th PCP
should assign to ISP coalition is R·ϕi and the profit that ISP
coalition should assign to the l-th ISP is R · ψl.
Consider the example in the previous section. Suppose
MISP = {ISP1, ISP2, ISP3}, MPCP = {PCP1,PCP2} and
T1 =
 0.8255 1.6509 2.47641.6509 1.6509 3.3019
0.8255 1.6509 1.6509
 ,
T2 =
 2.4764 1.2382 3.71461.2382 2.4764 1.2382
4.9528 2.4764 3.7146
 ,
T˜1 = diag(1.4151, 2.1226, 3.1840),
T˜2 = diag(3.7146, 2.6533, 3.7146).
Thus, we can deduce that the profit PCP coalition should
assign to ISP1, ISP2 and ISP3 are 1.1598, 1.0812 and 1.5040,
respectively. Now, consider a more general example with
(a) PCP
(b) ISP
Fig. 10. PCP and ISP profit transfer with different α and β.
(ϕ1, ϕ2) = (0.4, 0.6). We suppose the numbers of users in
ISP1, ISP2 and ISP3 are N1, N2 and N3, respectively and the
ratio of N1 : N2 : N3 is 2 : 3 : 5. Let N = N1 + N2 + N3.
Moreover, suppose all users have the same preferences and
behaviors. Then, the initially bought bandwidth is proportional
to the number of users, b1 : b2 : b3 = N1 : N2 : N3 = 2 : 3 : 5.
And the requirements of background traffic are also propor-
tional to the number of users, i.e., vS0CS1 : v
S0
CS2 : v
S0
CS3 =
N1 : N2 : N3. Besides, we assume P2P applications use
random peer selection scheme and the contents are distributed
uniformly among users. For the i-th P2P application, suppose
the average usage of each user is σi (i = 1, 2). Then, we can
obtain the traffic matrix of the i-th PCP as following
Ti = σi · (1− β) ·
 N1 · N1N N2 · N1N N3 · N1NN1 · N2N N2 · N2N N3 · N2N
N1 · N3N N2 · N3N N3 · N3N
 .
Moreover, based on our assumptions on users’ behaviors and
the above matrixes, we know that traffic provided by servers
for each network are also proportional to N1 : N2 : N3:
T˜i = diag(σi ·N1 · β, σi ·N2 · β, σi ·N3 · β).
Therefore, based on Eq.(25), we can get the ratio of three ISPs’
contribution weight as ψ1 : ψ2 : ψ3 = N1 : N2 : N3 = 2 : 3 :
5. Fig. 10 illustrates the amount of profit transfer of each PCP
and each ISP under different traffic profiles (0.3 ≤ α ≤ 0.9
and 0 ≤ β ≤ 0.5). We can see that with the increase of α or
β, such profit transfer will decrease.
B. Discussion
Fairness. Fairness of this mechanism is guaranteed by two
characteristics of ϕi and ψl: (1) ϕi increases with the total
traffic volume of the i-th PCP; and (2) ψl increases with the
total traffic volume on users’ side in the l-th ISP’s network, but
decreases with the total bandwidth bought by all users using a
flat price in the l-th ISP’s network. It can be easily verified that
this profit distribution mechanism has the following properties:
efficiency, symmetry and dummy player [6], [24], [25].
Feasibility. This mechanism can be easily implemented
because: (1) This mechanism is compatible with the traditional
Internet economic settlement. Transit ISPs do not join this
cooperation and the transit traffic still can be charged accord-
ing to the old economic agreements between transit ISPs and
eyeball ISPs; (2) All the information required by this profit
distribution mechanism can be easily collected from ISPs and
PCPs; (3) The calculation of this mechanism is easy.
V. RELATED WORK
There are two categories of strategies for ISPs to address
the problems caused by P2P. One belongs to engineering
means, which includes (1) negative resistance against P2P by
throttling, shaping, or blocking [11], [8] and (2) cooperation
with PCPs to efficiently manage P2P traffic [12], [14], [26],
[27], [13]. The former runs counter to the development trend
of P2P technology and may lead to PCPs’ countermeasures,
such as encryption and dynamic ports; while the latter may
involve legal problems and privacy issues.
Another category belongs to economic schemes. He et al.
[17] surveyed Internet pricing models and concluded that
pricing acts as an important auxiliary to control network traffic.
On this problem, one research direction is that ISPs change
pricing models towards P2P users [16], [17]. Two layers
of relationships (ISP-users and ISP-ISP) are often studied
based on non-cooperative game model [22], [23]. And other
researches giving insights to our work focus on the cooperative
interactions among CPs, ISPs and users, which aim to find a
multilateral satisfactory solution. For example, Hande et al.
[15] proposed CP-aided flow pricing to optimize the utilities
of ISP and CP. Misra et al. [28] proposed to fairly share profits
based on Shapley value [25] to stimulate peer-assisted services.
Altman et al. [29], [30] studied the charging and revenue
distribution between ISP and CP with different bargain power
based on Nash bargaining [18].
In this paper, we start from modeling non-cooperative game
behaviors of CPs, ISPs and users with a practical utility
optimization model. Then, we analyze a two-player non-
cooperative dynamic game between ISPs and PCPs. Since
cooperative game theory [18], [25] has been applied to many
network fields and shows desirable properties in corresponding
solutions [6], [24], [29], [30], [31], we use Nash Bargaining
Solution [18] to explore the benefits of cooperation and
guarantee fair profit distribution. To our knowledge, this is the
first work that systematically studies solutions for P2P caused
unbalanced profit distribution and gives a feasible cooperative
method to increase and fairly share profit.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Under traditional Internet pricing mechanism, free-riding
P2P traffic causes an unbalanced profit distribution between
PCPs and ISPs, which will drive ISPs to take actions against
P2P, finally impeding the wide adoption of P2P technology.
Therefore we propose a new cooperative profit-distribution
model based on the concept of Nash bargaining, in which ISPs
and PCPs form two coalitions respectively and then cooperate
to maximize their total profit. The fair profit distribution
between the two coalitions is determined based on Nash
Bargaining Solution (NBS). To guarantee the stability of each
coalition, a fair mechanism for profit distribution within each
coalition was designed. What is worth mentioning is that users
obtain higher utilities within this cooperation-based model.
As a result, such a cooperative profit-distribution method not
only guarantees the fair profit distribution among network
participators, but also improves the economic efficiency of the
overall network system.
Practical issues deserve further study before the adoption
of this new cooperative profit-distribution method. We will
study the supervision mechanisms between ISPs and PCPs and
those within each coalition. Also, we will consider the inherent
competitive relations among members within each coalition.
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